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JUDGE SONIA SOTOMAYOR’S TAX OPINIONS1
Prof. Stephen B. Cohen, Georgetown Law School
This article examines Judge Sonia Sotomayor’s three published
opinions in cases involving federal taxation, one as a District Court
judge and two as a Court of Appeals judge. Two of the opinions deal
with routine matters and will therefore be discussed only briefly. The
third opinion, which was reviewed by the Supreme Court, will be
discussed at greater length. Although Chief Justice Roberts, writing
for the Supreme Court, affirmed the result in this third opinion, he
criticized Judge Sotomayor’s reasoning (despite the fact that both the
Solicitor General and the Department of the Treasury had endorsed
it) and offered instead a different rationale. After a careful reading, I
find the rationale of Judge Sotomayor’s opinion as least as valid as,
and probably preferable to, that of Chief Justice Roberts. I also find
Chief Justice Roberts’ criticism of Judge Sotomayor’s rationale
logically flawed and therefore unwarranted.
Judge Sotomayor’s first tax opinion, Toker v U.S., 982 F. Supp.
197 (1997), written when she was a District Court judge, was affirmed
without opinion by the Second Circuit, 133 F. 3d 908 (2d Cir. 1997).
The taxpayers in Toker deducted losses for the years 1982, 1983,
and 1984 in connection with a car leasing partnership. After receiving
a deficiency notice from the IRS for 1982, the taxpayers filed a
petition contesting the deficiency with the U.S. Tax court. Two years
later, pursuant to a stipulation between the taxpayers and the IRS,
the Tax Court affirmed the deficiency, which the taxpayers paid
shortly thereafter. After receiving additional deficiency notices from
the IRS for 1983 and 1984, the taxpayers entered into a binding
written agreement with the IRS to settle the dispute and pay the
deficiencies.
Other participants in the car leasing partnership declined
settlement offers from the IRS and contested asserted deficiencies
before the Tax Court, where they ultimately prevailed. The taxpayers
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in Toker then filed suit in the District Court, claiming that the IRS had
agreed to refund their payment of asserted deficiencies if other
partners prevailed in litigation claiming the deductions.
Judge Sotomayor’s opinion granted the government’s motion
for summary judgment. With respect to the 1982 deductions, Judge
Sotomayor found that the District Court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction under § 6512(a), which provides that a taxpayer who files
a petition with the Tax Court is precluded from suing to recover the
disputed tax payment in another court.
With respect to the 1983 and 1984 deductions, Judge
Sotomayor ruled that the District Court had jurisdiction because the
taxpayers did not previously petition the Tax Court regarding their
1983 and 1984 tax liability. However, she granted summary
judgment because the written agreement with the IRS clearly and
unequivocally indicated that they entered into a final, binding
settlement.
Judge Sotomayor rejected, as barred by the parole evidence
rule, the taxpayers’ contention that the IRS agreed orally that if there
was a later determination that the deductions were correct, they
would be entitled to recover the payment of the deficiencies. In
reaching this conclusion, she followed decisions of the Second
Circuit, barring parole evidence to interpret agreements between
taxpayers and the IRS unless the written terms are ambiguous.
Judge Sotomayor also dismissed the taxpayers’ contention that
the parole evidence rule should be disregarded because they
justifiably relied on fraudulent statements by IRS employees that the
settlement agreement would not affect their substantive rights. She
cited the rule that justifiable reliance in fraud cases must consider
whether the truth was readily ascertainable by the allegedly
defrauded person. She then noted that Mr. Toker, an attorney and a
judge, could ascertain the true effect of the signed agreement simply
by referring to the plain language describing the settlement
agreement as a final, binding agreement.
Judge Sotomayor’s second opinion involving federal taxation
was as a Court of Appeals judge in Addington v. Commissioner, 205
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F.3d 54 (2nd Cir. 2000). Her affirmance of a Tax Court decision in
favor of the IRS was joined by then Chief Judge Ralph Winter and
Senior Judge Jon Newman. The taxpayers claimed that the Tax
Court erred in upholding the IRS assessment of negligence and
valuation overstatement penalties in connection with their 1981 and
1982 tax returns. The taxpayers invested in leasing partnerships that
acquired plastics recycling equipment. Although this equipment had
a fair market value not in excess of $50,000, the taxpayers claimed
tax deductions and credits based on assigning the equipment a value
of over $1 million.
Negligence penalties are imposed by § 6653 for “a lack of due
care or a failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person would
do under the circumstances.” Chimblo v. Commissioner, 177 F.3d
119, 126 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Goldman v. Commissioner, 39 F.3d
402, 406 (2d Cir. 1994). Similarly, under § 6659(e), the IRS may
waive the valuation overstatement penalty “on a showing by the
taxpayer that there was a reasonable basis for the valuation . . . .”
The taxpayers claimed that they should be relieved of both
negligence and valuation overstatement penalties because of their
reliance on the advice of a professor of tax law at New York
University Law School and a tax attorney who helped prepare the
equipment leasing partnership prospectus. Judge Sotomayor ruled
that it was unreasonable to rely on the law professor who stated to
the taxpayers that he was uncertain whether the prospectus correctly
valued the equipment and proposed that the taxpayers hire an
independent appraiser. She added that reliance on the opinion of the
tax attorney who was involved in preparing the prospectus was also
unjustified. Therefore, she concluded, the imposition of penalties was
valid.
The taxpayers also contended that they should be afforded the
same treatment as other investors in the partnership who were
relieved of negligence penalties in settlement agreements with the
IRS. Judge Sotomayor rejected that argument, noting that the
Commissioner made the same settlement offer to the taxpayers who
refused it.
Judge Sotomayor’s first two opinions involving taxation are
thoroughly researched, well reasoned, and clearly written.
3

Nevertheless, the reasoning and results are unremarkable in the
sense that it is difficult to imagine the cases coming out any other
way. Her third opinion, however, in William L. Rudkin Testamentary
Trust v. Commissioner, 467 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2006), aff'd sub nom.
Knight v. Commissioner, 552 U.S. 181, 128 S. Ct. 782 (2008),
generated a difference of opinion with Chief Justice Roberts
concerning the proper interpretation of § 67(e)(1).
The issue in Rudkin was whether investment advisory fees
incurred by a trust are “miscellaneous itemized deductions,”
deductible only to the extent that they (and other such deductions)
exceed 2% of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. The relevant
statutory provision, § 67(e)(1), provides that the expenses of a trust
are not treated as miscellaneous itemized deductions if the expenses
“would not have been incurred if the property were not held in trust.”2
The language of the statute is not susceptible of easy
application because it refers to a counterfactual. The language
directs us to assume that the property in question, which is in fact
held by a trust, is not held by a trust. We are then to determine
whether, in those hypothetical, counterfactual circumstances, the
owner would have incurred the expenses. Instead of applying the law
to facts that have occurred, we are asked to apply the law to
counterfactuals and imagine what would have occurred had the facts
been counter to what they were.
Given such problematic language, as well as an absence of
clear legislative intent, it is unsurprising that courts of appeal
disagreed about the meaning of § 67(e)(1). The Sixth Circuit
interpreted the language to mean that all expenses attributable to a
trustee’s fiduciary were expenses that “would not have been incurred
if the property were not held in trust.” Therefore, the Sixth Circuit
held that investment advisory fees incurred by a trust qualified under
§ 67(e)(1) because a trustee has a fiduciary duty to obtain investment
advice. O’Neill v. Commssioner, 994 F.2d 302. (6th Cir. 1993). On
2
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the other hand, the Federal Circuit held that § 67(e)(1) applies only to
expenses that are “not customarily incurred outside of trusts
[emphasis added].” Therefore, because investment advisory fees are
customarily incurred by individuals, such fees do not fall under
§ 67(e)(1). Mellon Bank, N.A. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1275
(Fed. Cir. 2001). The Fourth Circuit agreed, ruling that investment
advisory fees do not qualify because they are customarily incurred
outside the context of trust administration. Scott v. United States,
328 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 2003).
Judge Sotomayor properly rejected the Sixth Circuit’s
construction of Section 67(e)(1) as contrary to the language of that
provision, which asks, not whether the expenses were incurred
because of the trustee’s fiduciary duty, but rather whether the
expenses would have been incurred had the property been held by
an individual owner:
[T]he phrase “if such property were not held in
trust” more logically directs the inquiry away
from the trust and back toward the
hypothetical ownership of property by an
individual . . . . It focuses the inquiry, instead,
on the hypothetical situation where the assets
are in the hands of an individual. 467 F.3d
155.
She was concerned, however, that the construction adopted by
the Federal and Fourth Circuits—focusing on whether an individual
owner would customarily incur the expenses—involves a subjective
and uncertain standard. She argued that “the statute demands not a
“subjective” inquiry “but rather an objective determination of whether
the particular cost is one that is peculiar to trusts and one that
individuals are incapable of incurring.” 467 F. 3d 156:
While the Federal and Fourth Circuits’
approach properly focuses the inquiry on the
hypothetical situation of costs incurred by
individuals as opposed to trusts, that inquiry
into whether a given cost is “customarily” or
“commonly” incurred by individuals is
5

unnecessary and less consistent with the
statutory language. We believe that the plain
text of § 67(e) requires that we determine with
certainty that costs could not have been
incurred if the property were held by an
individual. We therefore hold that the plain
meaning of the statute permits a trust to take
a full deduction only for those costs that could
not have been incurred by an individual
property owner. 467 F.3d 156.3
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s
decision but preferred the construction of Section 67(e)(1) adopted by
the Federal and Fourth Circuits: that Section 67(e)(1) exempts
expenses that would not customarily be incurred if an individual
owned the property held in trust. Knight v. Commissioner, 552 U.S.
181, ___; 128 S. Ct. 782, 789 (2008).
Chief Justice Roberts conceded the subjective and uncertain
nature of the inquiry under this construction:
The question whether a trust-related expense
is fully deductible turns on a prediction about
what would happen if a fact were changed—
specifically, if the property were held by an
individual rather than a trust. In the context of
making such a prediction, when there is
uncertainty about the answer, the word
“would” is best read as “express[ing] concepts
such as custom, habit, natural disposition, or
probability,” [citations omitted]. . . .The text
requires determining what would happen if a
fact were changed; such an exercise
3
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necessarily entail a prediction; and predictions
are based on what would customarily or
commonly occur.” 552 U.S. 181, ___; 128
S.Ct. 782, 789-790.
Chief Justice Roberts also criticized Judge Sotomayor’s
reasoning:
In applying the statute, the Court of Appeals
below asked whether the cost at issue could
have been incurred by an individual. This
approach flies in the face of the statutory
language. The provision at issue asks
whether the costs “would not have been
incurred if the property were not held” in trust
. . . not, as the Court of Appeals would have
it, whether the costs “could not have been
incurred in such a case . . . . The fact that an
individual could not do something is one
reason he would not, but not the only possible
reason. If Congress had intended the Court of
Appeals; reading, it could easily have
replaced “would” in the statute with “could,”
and presumably would have.” The fact that it
did not adopt this readily available and
apparent alternative strongly supports
rejecting the Court of Appeals’ reading. 552
U.S. 181, ___, 128 S. Ct. 787.
Chief Justice Roberts’ criticism of Judge Sotomayor, however,
begs the question. If Congress had intended his preferred reading of
Section 67(e)(1), it could have easily inserted the word “customarily”
in the provision. Why, in his own words, doesn’t “[t]he fact that it did
not adopt this readily available and apparent alternative strongly
[support] rejecting” his reading of the provision?
In fact, there are at least two plausible readings of the
language of Section 67(e)(1). It could be interpreted by reading into
the statute after the words “would not” the word “customarily.” Or it
could be interpreted by reading into the statute after the words “would
7

not” the word “ever.” Either reading is plausible. In the first case, the
statute is interpreted to read “would not customarily have been
incurred” and requires a subjective judgment about what is
customary. In the second case, the statute is interpreted to read
“would not ever have been incurred,” and requires determining
whether the expense was one that an individual could not incur.
Neither Chief Justice Roberts’, nor Judge Sotomayor’s construction
“flies in the face of the statutory language.” Chief Justice Roberts’
criticism of Judge Sotomayor is unpersuasive and overstated.
Justice Roberts also claimed that Judge Sotomayor
disregarded the first clause of Section 67(e)(1), which refers to costs
“paid or incurred in connection with the administration” of a trust. He
stated:
[I]f the Court of Appeals' reading were correct, it is
not clear why Congress would have included in the
statute the first clause of § 67(e)(1). If the only costs that
are fully deductible are those that could not be incurred
outside the trust context-that is, that could only be
incurred by trusts-then there would be no reason to place
the further condition on full deductibility that the costs be
“paid or incurred in connection with the administration of
the ... trust,”§ 67(e)(1). We can think of no expense that
could be incurred exclusively by a trust but would
nevertheless not be “paid or incurred in connection with”
its administration. 552 U.S. 181, ___, 128 S. Ct. 787.
This criticism, however, itself misreads the statutory scheme by
disregarding Section 67(e)(2). Section 67(e) divides all trust
deductions into two categories: (1) deductions for costs incurred in
connection with the administration of a trust; and (2) the standard
deduction and deductions for distributions to trust beneficiaries.
Section 67(e)(1) requires that deductions in the first category (that is,
deductions incurred in connection with the administration of a trust)
“would not have been incurred if the property were not held in such
trust.” Section 67(e)(2), in contrast, does not impose such a “would
not have been incurred” requirement for either the standard deduction
or distributions to trust beneficiaries. Thus, the purpose of the “paid
or incurred in connection with the administration of [a] trust” language
8

in the first clause of Section 67(e)(1) is to separate deductions
subject to the “would not have been incurred” requirement from
specified deductions under Section 67(e)(2) that are not subject to
that requirement. Obviously, the first clause of Section 67(e)(1)
serves this purpose under either Judge Sotomayor’s or Judge
Roberts’ reading of the “would not have been incurred language” of
the second clause of Section 67(e)(2).
Both the Treasury and the Solicitor General affirmed the
validity, and perhaps the superiority, of Judge Sotomayor’s approach.
Following the issuance of her opinion, the Treasury proposed
interpretive regulations adopting her reading of the statute. In
addition, the Solicitor General’s brief to the Supreme Court, urged
that her second circuit opinion be approved as “an easily
administrable rule.” 552 U.S. 181, ___, n. 3; 128 S.Ct. 782, 787, n. 3.
Others have criticized Justice Roberts’ opinion for creating
confusion and uncertainty:
By adopting the Fourth and Federal Circuits'
interpretation of the second condition of
§ 67(e)(1), the [Supreme] Court has added to
the confusion surrounding the exception,
rather than clarifying its application. By
focusing the inquiry on what expenses are
“uncommon (or unusual, or unlikely) for . . . a
hypothetical individual to incur,” it is unclear
which expenses will qualify for the exception
and which expenses will not. While this
standard is not as restrictive as the Second
Circuit's interpretation, its application is more
difficult and burdensome. The Court's
standard does not develop a bright line test
subjecting all investment advisory fees to the
2% floor. Rather, only those fees that are
“commonly incurred by individuals” are subject
to the floor. During oral argument, the Court
struggled with how the “commonly incurred”
language would be applied to determine the
deductibility of other expenses. Based on the
9

lack of certainty in this standard, there is room
to argue that certain fees incurred by a trust
were for specialized services that are not
commonly incurred by individuals. In such a
situation, the dicta in the last paragraph of the
Court's decision may require the trustee to
bifurcate the fee into fees commonly incurred
by individuals and fees not commonly incurred
by individuals. This potential requirement,
created by the dicta of the opinion, adds even
more confusion to an already confusing
standard: Those fees attributable to services
that are common for individuals are subject to
the 2% floor of § 67(a), while those fees
attributable to specialized services for the trust
and not common for individuals are not
subject to the 2% floor and are fully deductible
by the trust. This standard leaves much to be
desired. It suggests that financial advisors
have the burden of tracking and separating
fees into categories of those common for
individuals and those that are not.4
Another commentator echoes this concern:
[T]he Court in Knight conceded that figuring
what costs are common is an uncertain
exercise and even difficult to administer
without regulatory guidance. In spite of that
admission, it further complicated the tax
treatment of investment advisory fees by
declaring that such fees could merit full
deductibility if there were special charges on

4
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account of the trust's fiduciary duties.5
In contrast, Judge Sotomayor’s opinion in Knight was informed
by her awareness of and concern for the real world consequences of
adopting one interpretation of Section 67(e)(1) or the other. Given
two plausible ways of reading the statute, she preferred an
interpretation that affords more certainty and less confusion. She
was sensitive to the practical implications of her decision for
taxpayers and their advisors struggling to cope with a complex and
often badly drafted tax statute.
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